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Abstract
This article explores the nature of calls for risk-based policy present in expert discourse
from a cultural theory perspective. Semi-structured interviews with professionals
engaged in the research andmanagement of livestock disease control provide the data for
a reading proposing that the real basis of policy relating to socio-technical hazards is
deeply political and cannot be purified through ‘escape routes’ to objectivity. Scientists
and risk managers are shown calling, on the one hand, for risk-based policy approaches
while on the other acknowledging a range of policy drivers outside the scope of conven-
tional quantitative risk analysis including group interests, eventualities such as out-
breaks, historical antecedents, emergent scientific advances and other contingencies.
Calls for risk-based policy are presented, following cultural theory, as ideals connected to
a reductionist epistemology and serving particular professional interests over others
rather than as realistic proposals for a paradigm shift.
Introduction
T he cultural theory of risk (or cultural theory) argues that we should be thank-ful for a society in which the discourse on risk is highly politicised because
this demonstrates a healthy, free debate on values (Douglas 1992a). Quests for
depoliticised, objective footings on which to found conceptions of risk, Douglas
continues, neglect the profound significance of culture yet appeal to experts seeking
to escape the messy, contested realities of the social world by bracketing them off in
the quest for less troublesome probabilistic approaches. Following Durkheim,
Douglas (1992a) argues that any comprehensive theory of social action must face up
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to the centrality of culture and in particular account for group representations. This
article attempts to explore these arguments in the context of livestock disease risk
management, a domain in which calls for risk-based policy are persistent, as we will
show, and appear to represent precisely the sort of ill-founded escapism Douglas
(1992a) seeks to challenge. This article considers the function of the calls for more
risk-based policy in the rhetoric of a particular group of experts and attempts to
account for it with concepts from the cultural theory of risk.
Livestock disease risk is a context that has been increasingly prominent on the
socio-political agenda in recent years. The UK, in particular, has experienced severe
effects from livestock disease, most notably through the bovine spongiform encepha-
lopathy (BSE) crisis that emerged in the mid-1980s, and the foot and mouth disease
(FMD) outbreak of 2001. More recently, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
has refocused interest worldwide on the risks and uncertainties connected to the
human-animal interface. This high-profile animal disease management context pro-
vides a space in which long-standing and seemingly incompatible views on the
interactions between risk and society can be debated.
The paradigm critiqued in this article and one prominent in positivist epistemol-
ogy is the view that public policy toward uncertainty ought to be foundationally
informed by objective, scientific and technical risk assessment rather than being a
hostage to fortune through politics or irrational public responses (Burnstein 1996).
Risk professionals and technical experts often articulate this idea through calls for
risk-based policy, arguing that better outcomes can be effected by a rational, quanti-
tative mechanism, able to set policy on a neutral, objective footing, unpolluted by
messy, socio-political distractions. Objective risk assessment, according to this
worldview, ought to provide a foil to common, destabilising, political vagaries by
grounding policy in untainted, neutral, formal risk assessment. Quantitative risk
analysis is an established discipline that appears well placed to overcome this messi-
ness by differentiating incalculable uncertainty from calculable risk measured
through probabilities (for example Vose 2008). In relation to disease containment,
risk modelling and epidemiology are disciplines strongly associated with the risk-
based rhetoric explored below.
What distinguishes a risk-based approach from other approaches is essentially a
systematic attempt to assign more resources to those factors likely to have greater
effect if the risk event occurs. The rationale of risk-based policy has been summarised
in the epithet ‘worst things first’ (Finkel 1994). For epidemiological hazards, a par-
ticular pathway may be assessed to be more significant in transmitting an infectious
agent or predisposing to disease (either actually or potentially) and therefore may
warrant more control, surveillance, eradication, or some other intervention. With
BSE, for example, particular beef cuts were removed from the human food chain
because the risk assessment determined that they were more likely to cause human
cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Here, the risk-based approach strives to offer an
objective approach grounded in probabilistic calculation to support decision-making.
The rationale of the risk-based approach has been persuasive; throughout the 1970s
and 1980s it was highly influential in environmental policy thinking. Philosophically,
it has its origins in Cartesian analysis and in the empirical, utilitarian approaches of
Bentham and Mill (Rosa 2000). Central to the reductionist logic is the idea that the
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benefit upon which the actuarial, or probabilistic analysis hinges, is uncontested
(Busby and Duckett 2012; Duckett and Busby 2013). It may appear uncontentious, for
example, that a maximum return on investment is the overriding objective for a fund
manager, provided statutory legal obligations are fulfilled, although, even in this case,
ethical considerations may interrupt the narrow economic logic of social benefit.
Socio-environmental hazards, including animal diseases, tend to be much more
complex cases, often with incommensurable containment objectives.
A quantitative approach capable of overcoming the complexity of social benefit has
long been a goal of risk theorists beginning with Starr (1969) yet has remained elusive
(Douglas 1992a). This was starkly evident during the UK FMD outbreak in 2001
when benefits for some actors in the British beef trade clashed with a host of other
social concerns in a crisis that has been extensively studied (for example, Woods
2004; Mort et al. 2005). In direct challenge to the reductionist paradigm of risk-based
approaches, subjectivist social theories of risk have emerged, with proponents
arguing that risk assessment is itself an inescapably political process. Quantitative
risk analysis, it is argued, is no more value-free than other overtly political processes.
In particular, cultural theory (for example, Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Dake 1992;
Thompson 2008) proposes that the application of quantitative risk analysis to matters
of social concern as though it were a neutral, objective process is epistemologically
misconceived, particularly in relation to technological fixes. The selection and appli-
cation of science, technology, and indeed of any putative knowledge, is loaded with a
tendency to support one set of interests over others (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Law
1991; Wynne 2008; Shortall 2013). The fundamental idea behind the critique of a
neutral calculus of risk (Beck 1992) is that while quantitative risk analysis is extremely
powerful when properly directed, it is not an appropriate tool for grounding socio-
economic and socio-political decisions over complex social issues that have contested
and incommensurate dimensions. Probabilistic approaches are singularly effective in
reducing uncertainty, the critics concede, in tackling some well-structured problems,
for example, in engineering (Wynne 1992) or gambling (Douglas 1986). However, in
relation to environmental hazards, where issues of the highest order of complexity are
to be found, probabilistic approaches are not sufficiently comprehensive mechanisms
to underpin complex choices on social organisation (Douglas 1992a). Far from accept-
ing the probabilistic risk-based approach as the best guarantor of objectivity, shielding
society from the more irrational effects of interest-based politics, Douglas challenges
the very legitimacy of ‘escape routes to objectivity’ (Douglas 1992a, p. 11), arguing that
risk policy is rarely constructed on the basis of calculating numbers. Moreover, it is
only within a political and cultural context, allowing for particular forms of social
organisation, norms, roles, interests and contingencies that social behaviour in
response to risk can be properly understood (Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Douglas
1992a, 1992b).
Others agree, labelling risk-based regulation ‘a mirage’ (MacGillivray et al. 2011)
and identifying within dominant probabilistic risk discourse a subversive scientism
that acts to make other socially useful understandings invisible (Wynne 1992). The
apparent straightforwardness of assigning resources to risks, when applied to envi-
ronmental issues, is, in practice, always highly politicised according to the critics.
Competing claims for prioritisation that attempt to weigh different sorts of harms,
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such as the welfare of animals against economic interests, do not ideally lend them-
selves to probabilistic analysis (Commoner 1994). The result, according to Douglas
(1992a) is that throughout the actual process of policy formation for tackling risk,
probabilistic conceptions are held at arm’s length. Douglas (1992a) argues that, rather
than being invoked at the inception of policy, as a risk-based policy implies, a periph-
eral deployment of quantitative risk analysis is both evident in practice and desirable
for democratic societies. As Winston Churchill is reported to have said, scientific
advisors should be ‘on tap not on top’.
In contradistinction to this marginalisation of ‘risk as probability’ in policy debate,
within the discourse of risk analysis, Douglas claims that the very opposite
marginalisation comes to the fore:
When I tried to engage established risk analysts in conversation I soon gathered that to
emphasize these dubious uses of risk is perverse, a dirty way of talking about a clean
scientific subject. Though they recognize that the grime and heat of politics are involved in
the subject of risk, they sedulously bracket them off. Their professional objective is to get at
the real essence of risk perception before it is polluted by interests and ideology. (Douglas
1992a, p. 11)
In light of these anecdotal observations from Douglas about the way quantitative risk
and politics are in practice typically and understandably disconnected, this article
examines expert discourse in which calls for risk-based policy are clearly articulated.
In short, despite significant critical work detailing challenges that seem to require the
conventional political footing upon which policy rests (Kasperson et al. 1988; Renn
et al. 1992; Slovic 2000) rather than risk-based policy, strong rhetorical calls for the
latter approach persist. What makes this a matter of grave concern, critics claim, is
that the calls for change originate from self-styled peaceful centres of progress and
rationality (Beck 1992) often masking other important dimensions (Wynne 1992).
A rural economy and land use program (RELU) project under the title Lost in
Translation (Austin et al. 2012b), from which the data set explored in this article has
been drawn, set out to improve the efficacy of knowledge exchange in the animal
disease context. Three particular animal diseases encompassing some of the diversity
that make this area particularly challenging from a socio-technical standpoint were
targeted by the project and will be briefly summarised in the next section. The basic
premise, reflected in the project’s title, is that there are boundaries between, and
perhaps to a lesser extent within, different groups of social actors that result in
communication failures and lack of mutual understanding. These failures are detri-
mental to effective disease-control strategies. Through interviews conducted in this
project we examine the discourse of risk-based policy with the wider goal of helping
to facilitate better policy decisions.
Our analysis proceeds by first identifying persistent calls for risk-based policy in
the discourse. We then attempt to empirically demonstrate Douglas’s contention
(1992a) that probabilistic risk approaches, including quantitative risk analysis, are at
best peripheral or (in her words) ‘arm’s length’ policy drivers. We show this by
identifying other types of risk construction present in the data which, we argue, are
more central in practice and are important in a democratic society. The empirical
evidence we draw upon is not policy itself but the discourse (captured through
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qualitative interviews) of influential actors who are closely connected with risk man-
agement for livestock diseases and who inform policy. It is worth noting here that
other studies have looked directly at the policy level, for example:
Interestingly, the term ‘probability’ has not been mentioned in the WFD [the EU Water
framework Directive], the guidance documents or the expert interviews. (Sigel et al. 2010,
p. 505)
Our article then turns, in the discussion, following Douglas (1992a), to accounting for
both the absence of probabilistic terminology and the presence of more overtly
political elements which, we argue, are general and necessary features of policy
development. Furthermore, we attempt to illustrate, through a cultural theory reading
of the data, that persistent calls for risk-based policy have a rhetorical function that
acts to promote the professional group interests of those making them; actors who
are, by and large, shown to be fully aware that they are necessarily engaged in the ‘heat
and grime’ of politics. An elaboration of this reading is continued in the conclusion,
where more general significance is claimed for the study, which we believe is repre-
sentative of professional practice in relation to other socio-technical hazards
Three animal diseases illustrative of containment policy challenges
Different diseases exemplify particular risks and uncertainties. For example, distinct
pathways exist for different diseases; varying scales of impact affect their socioeco-
nomic trajectories and different configurations of animal/human relationships bring
with them particular challenges for disease containment. The three diseases outlined
below were chosen to allow a broad insight into these layered complexities.
Cryptosporidiosis is a water-borne zoonotic disease (that is, one that is naturally
transmitted between vertebrate animals and humans). Outbreaks in human popula-
tions are typically connected with contaminated drinking water. Symptoms include
abdominal cramping and diarrhoea. Water contamination is usually caused by
infected faecal matter from animal hosts. In the UK the problem is commonly
associated with the proximity of farm animals to drinking water catchments. The
problem has particular management issues in the context of the privatised for-profit
water industry operating in the UK (excluding Scotland) post-deregulation. The
zoonotic dimension involves issues of public health that are absent in many animal
diseases.
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is an infectious viral disease that affects cloven-
hoofed animals. It does not infect humans but the presence of the disease has
profound social and economic implications. The UK has historically followed a strict
policy of culling infected and contiguous herds. The widely dispersed outbreak in the
UK in 2001 was the world’s worst in a previously FMD-free country and was marked
with media images showing burning pyres of culled livestock. Animal movement
restrictions were enforced and additional biosecurity practices frequently had the
effect of isolating rural communities in their homes and farms, causing children to
miss up to 6 months of schooling and stopping recreational activity in many country-
side areas (Convery et al. 2005). The net effects of the epidemic included significant
reductions in rural tourism in many areas of Britain (Scott et al. 2004).
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Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) has the potential to cause global pan-
demic (Oxford 2005). A previous genotype of avian flu in 1918 killed millions of
people around the globe (Kolata 2000). Like other viral diseases it has the potential to
mutate into novel forms for which human populations have limited immunity, and
for which treatments and preventive medicines may take time to develop and distrib-
ute. In the UK, 2007 wasmarked by outbreaks of the dangerous H5N1 variant of avian
flu in Holton, Sussex and Diss, Norfolk and led to the culling of commercial poultry
accompanied by worldwide media attention (Martin et al. 2006).
More broadly, the containment of animal disease exemplifies narratives that are
constructed around risk by professionals involved in managing socio-technical risks.
Management outcomes often appear inherently intractable where technological solu-
tions are emergent and scientific understanding is incomplete, giving prominence to
restricted, defined uncertainties whilst obscuring other understandings (Wynne
1992).
Interviews with stakeholders: some notes on method
The RELU project, of which the present research formed a part, provided a rich data set
of semi-structured interview transcripts from a programme systematically designed to
engage a range of participants from policy-level actors to scientists working in labora-
tories and to industry insiders, all chargedwith responsibility for riskmanagement and
disease containment. The composition of the stakeholder group was designed to cut
across policy scales, incorporating people at operational, tactical and strategic levels
(Fish et al. 2011). In total 54 individual and small group stakeholder interviews were
conducted. The interviews explored important emerging cross-disease themes, encom-
passing issues such as biosecurity, trade and communication. The interviewees con-
sidered disease management in the context of their own roles and experiences with
respect to the three diseases outlined above (Austin et al. 2012a).
This article examines the calls for risk-based policy in the data set and shows how
these particular rhetorical elements coexist with the more nuanced understandings of
risk also present in our data. Sociological challenges to the risk-based policy paradigm
are then developed, guided by insights from cultural theory.
The central issue put to the contributors during semi-structured interviews, focus
groups and workshops concerned scientific uncertainty and its incorporation in policy
development. The rationale for the project was that strategies of animal disease
containment face considerable socio-technological challenges that could potentially
benefit from an examination of often overlooked uncertainties.
That the general public or the popular media, when thinking about hazards, do not
begin with quantification or other elements of formal risk analysis is perhaps trivial.
The analysis presented here supports a more nuanced claim and one that has a strong
tradition in sociology, that even people well-versed in scientific methodologies,
familiar with the latest research in their field and calling for risk-based policy them-
selves in many instances (as shown in excerpts below), are, in practice, constructing
their risk facts in the same kinds of non-probabilistic and political terms as the
general population (see Latour and Woolgar 1986) or as diverse cultures (Douglas
1992a). This is particularly pertinent given that some theorists have argued that
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experts and lay people are at opposite ends of a spectrum in matters of risk analysis;
the former operating within a probabilistic paradigm, and the latter navigating their
world with the aid of less precise instruments or on gut instinct (Slovic 1987; Jensen
et al. 2005). This popular distinction is challenged in this article where our data show
that the contributors, who were ably qualified to discuss the problems of animal
disease containment in terms of probabilities and quantifiable impacts given their
expert credentials, were also quite at home constructing a risk discourse consistent
with cultural theory. An analysis of the transcripts is presented below.
Two significant assumptions underlie the analysis. The first is that the situations
explored here are indicative of more general patterns of concept foundation and that
individual performances are open to a wider interpretation as symbolic actions in the
context of other performances. The meanings of words without reference to this
context become, largely, empty speculations. Indeed, content analysis is founded on
the idea that discourse in all its forms can reveal something about the way people
think (Krippendorff 2013).
The second assumption is that findings drawn from the analysis are not artefacts
of the research methodology, owing their existence to the conscious imposition by
researchers. Interrogation of the data for evidence of the characteristics that Douglas
(1992a) describes was not a factor in the design or execution of the data-gathering
exercise, which was carried out by other researchers with a quite separate research
agenda in what was a wide-ranging project (Austin et al. 2012b). An adventitious
opportunity to subject the data set to such analysis arose after the fact, independently
from any explicit interest in cultural theory. This is not to say that the researchers who
gathered the data were free from bias and we accept that under different circum-
stances another data set might offer less support to the conclusions drawn here.
The article proceeds by first presenting excerpts from the data with interpretations
illustrating the tensions between probability risk assessment and policy development.
The contributors are shown to call for risk-based policy development. They are further
shown in subsequent excerpts, sometimes paradoxically, exhibiting strong sympa-
thies for more conventional political approaches.
Contributors’ calling for risk-based policy
Calls for risk-based policy in the data appeared in the form of criticisms of policies
perceived as reactive. Typically, outbreak events were said to precede unplanned and
disproportionate policy responses instead of apolitical, measured approaches. Indi-
vidual formulations differed in detail but adhered to this general shape consistent
with Douglas’ observation that clean or untainted risk-based policy exists as a hypo-
thetical alternative to polluted or flawed politically driven policy (Douglas 1992a).
In this first excerpt, policymakers were alleged to have shifted their attention from
one issue to another as a result of the H1N1 swine flu outbreak of 2009:
You know, if you look at policymakers in Defra and Drinking Water Inspectorate and the
Scottish Government, they’re busy people, they’re driven politically. I mean, we’ve been
trying to do or complete some work on looking at water treatment interventions – and we’ve
been looking at that in a series of immunological surveys, which has lasted three years and
the difficulty has been right now the intervention of H1N1 on policy that they have to
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undertake just to make sure, and so, whatever the greater perceived risk, and I think that’s
a political rather than a clinical risk.
The excerpt contains a contradistinction in which rational process, marked by rigor-
ous scientific method, here ‘a series of immunological surveys’ is interrupted by an
immediate change, ‘right now’ caused by an outbreak that redefines risk politically
rather than clinically. This exemplifies a generic shape, identified throughout the
transcripts, where a preferable risk-based or evidenced-based modus operandi (in this
example, the completion of years of work ascertaining ‘clinical risk’) is said to be put
into jeopardy by a political approach. The speaker here partly excuses policymakers on
the grounds that they are busy, but this allowance does not extend to endorsing the
political turn of events.
A second opinion echoed this logic:
So there are things we know that we can – that would work that we’re unable to apply
because of public, or honestly, I think, political qualms. My [laughs] experience of evidence-
based policy is that where science and politics meet, politics always wins.
Here again, valuable knowledge is juxtaposed to politics. There is an epistemological
idealisation of a scientific approach to risk; ‘things ... that we know that would work’,
by which it is implied that the issue at hand would be controlled more effectively,
indeed; may never have arisen had the reductionist paradigm been foundational.
Similar notions are championed repeatedly by the interviewees, who hold their solu-
tion (risk-based or variously evidence-based policy) to be an alternative preferred to
policy predicated on political considerations, pejoratively labelled ‘qualms’. Critics
have interpreted such expressed preferences as misguided aspirations for the ‘domes-
tication’ of risk (Wynne 1992).
Simply put, risk-based policy is widely understood as aspiring to address ‘the worst
the most’ or, in other words, ensuring a logically identified, more serious issue
receives more resources than a less serious one (see Finkel 1994). This notion was
echoed throughout the data, in a way reminiscent of a mission statement:
So you should focus most on the risk. And in fact the DWI [Drinking Water Inspectorate] –
the regulations in 1999 were risk-based, because you did a risk assessment, and it was only
those sites that failed the risk assessment that had to do the continuous monitoring.
Instead of this idealised risk-based approach, represented as an unmitigated success
when adopted, the policy is said to be compromised by being event-driven which, in
the current disease context, typically involves being reactive to outbreaks:
And the difficulty that you have is that it’s actually quite hard to, in most cases, get people to
really focus and put the resources into these areas until it’s a real incident.
An apparent premise, and one that requires careful examination, is that response to
risk is frequently misdirected in respect of the prioritisation of hazards due to a lack
of risk-based policy. This view received repeated rhetorical support in the data, often
with explicit normative characteristics: ‘We ought to be focused most on risk’, according
to a participating risk analyst. It is as though there were a moral imperative of risk. A
386 Duckett ET AL.
© 2014 The Authors. Sociologia Ruralis published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Society for
Rural Sociology.
Sociologia Ruralis, Vol 55, Number 4, October 2015
rational society, contributors argued, ought to act on the basis of proper quantitative
risk assessment and not leave policy to the mercy of incidental circumstances:
... it’s not the absolute, as it were, measure of the importance of the policy, it’s the political
influence that changes and then the policy changes as a result ... sometimes almost inci-
dentally, somebody comes up with a real, you know, a new drug or a strategy of some sort
that will combat one of those low grade diseases and you do get a real initiative. Or
alternatively, it’s a disease that becomes so important to industry because of its economic
impact that industry itself actually, you know, gets its act together and does something about
it. But these are the sort of listings [prioritising diseases logically] that in a way we should be
doing all the time. [Our emphasis]
The preceding excerpt exemplifies another tension that was repeatedly identified in
the data. Circumstantial drivers are broadly accepted as efficacious, leading to ‘real
initiatives’ or ‘something being done’, but they are also criticised as unsystematic.
Rather the speaker bemoans the lack of absolute measures from which priorities can
always be set without the necessity of chance innovation through a new drug or the
escalating financial impact of a disease. This excerpt typifies a repeated idealised
commitment to an approach transcending politics that was incongruously set against
insights acknowledging that reactive approaches were successful. An analysis of the
transcripts showed that the contributors not only had sophisticated understandings of
the constraints under which policy operates, but that they were frequently strongly
supportive of politically based policy outcomes. Working within a complex social
milieu, the participants unsurprisingly appreciated political realities; however, this
recognition of politics exceeded a grudging acknowledgement of serendipity and
respondents frequently supported politically driven outcomes that were at odds with
their commitments to risk-based approaches. Several comments acknowledged that
there was a de facto circumstantial dimension, sometimes historical, sometimes
newly emergent. These included reflective comments on the uncertainties of disease
containment that were grounded in detailed appreciations of political circumstances
that led contributors to paradoxical conclusions about the relationship between ideal-
ised risk-based policy and actual ‘warts and all’ policy:
So with cryptosporidium there was the very large outbreaks in Hull and Oxford, and the fact
that they’d occurred meant that there was a government response ... And so as a result of
that, over the years things have been done to improve the situation. It’s not necessarily the
same in the rest of Europe. So if you don’t have the routine surveillance, which we do, then
you won’t pick up the outbreaks. And therefore you won’t have the political incentive to do
something. So it’s kind of a chicken and egg – you know.
This recognition that outbreaks can drive measures that ultimately feed back into
improvements was repeated among the contributors on all three disease issues
focused on in the analysis:
... it’s all dependant on the outbreaks. So if you don’t have outbreaks – you know – there’s
no pressure from the public to sort things out.
These contradistinctions, held at times in parallel by the same contributor, showed the
participants’ awareness of an inherent paradox in their statements over risk and
uncertainty. Outbreaks were often seen as essential, if not necessarily ideal drivers of
policy.
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The chicken and egg metaphor introduced by several participants is a feature of
particular interest. It seems to be paradoxical to the interviewees precisely because
they find it difficult to envisage effective risk-based policy existing prior to the political
pressures already being in place (typically generated by outbreaks) and yet this is their
explicit goal in calling for risk-based policy.
In a variation of the paradox an expert from a veterinary laboratory describes
attempts to model risk at an early stage before sufficient data was available to under-
take effective analysis:
We introduced risk analysis into crypto far too early. We could have, should have saved our
money, done research on it and then – But, chicken, egg, I mean, we didn’t realise it was so
crap until we did it, but it was really trendy at the time and even Defra wanted it in there.
The data also included recognitions of wider, overriding structural conditions that
constrain and shape animal disease-containment policies:
... the world is, of course, split, you know ... between the FMD free and the FMD endemic.
The FMD free have lots of resources, lots of tools and lots of fancy gizmos. The FMD
endemic have no money, no resource and ... lots of FMD.
In the face of global challenges of this scale, quantitative risk analysis plays an
essential role but contributors concurrently held other drivers to be foundational in
the development of policy, for example, powerful actors with financial muscle, tech-
nological innovation, and the unpredictable occurrence of disease outbreaks that
serve to galvanise networks of support.
What we aim to have established from the analysis is that rhetorical calls for
risk-based policy are tempered, even by those making them, by a recognition that
there are other powerful contenders for the position of policy base. That outbreaks, or
other circumstances, rather than probabilistic risk analysis, shape public policy would
be, to many readers, unsurprising. When asked what might derail the politician
apparently set fair, a wily campaigner (allegedly Harold Macmillan) is apocryphally
said to have remarked ‘events, dear boy!’ In other words, there is a constant stream of
what Galbraith (1977) refers to as ‘the tyranny of circumstances’ that will often
determine the political course, regardless of well-intentioned efforts to use risk tools
to plan sensible strategies.
The pursuit of professional interests
The theme ‘grant or funding’ is a familiar concern to most researchers, the current
authors being no exception, and a certain meeting of minds between researchers and
interviewees may have emphasised the theme to some extent. Nevertheless, the
prominence of the funding theme, woven into accounts of animal disease contain-
ment risks and uncertainties by this mixed group of scientists, veterinarians and risk
managers, demands a theoretical explanation.
In part the participants enrolled in the research may have simply picked up on the
uncertainty theme and translated it into the uncertainties of their professional lives,
taking the opportunity in conversation to share their frustrations and reflections
about the difficult fiscal environment in which they operate. Further than this,
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however, we argue that the constraints imposed by discretionary funding act to shape
outcomes that have a real bearing on disease containment. One dimension of this
shaping seemed to become evident early in several interviews, as participants
explained how they had come to occupy their current role or embark upon the career
paths that had led them there. The contributors explained how the availability of
funding had influenced research topics and partly steered them in certain directions.
This driver, in their view, often had little to do with risk, for example:
If you see the money that goes into toxoplasma, it is a big, big item within that field and they
get a fair amount of research funding and yet it is not a particularly important infection.
Although the consequences can be devastating it is relatively rare.... You know if you make
an interesting case for addressing a biological question and that is usually good enough ...
It’s more a biological interest that is driving it. We have to package it as a public health thing
because that is how we get the money but my own interest is really more a biological interest
in these organisms.
This plausible account of idiosyncratic drivers of disease research was echoed else-
where in the data:
A lot of the research is driven by, you know intellectual curiosity and interest in some
biological questions, which I think is fine but you know I have some doubts about the
relevance of that to control [of animal disease].
The point here is that the process by which a particular disease is selected for scientific
research is not itself on the basis of ‘most research for worst hazard’. Researchers
select their objects of study on the basis of their own personal histories in much the
same way as other people choose careers. Once it has been selected, the researcher is
invested in the particular object of study and is in competition with other researchers
promoting rival studies:
... the scientist has that double identity because the scientist is simultaneously, in an
academic context, you’re trying to draw down funds; they’re working simultaneously say in
a fundamental experimental science context and then also being the salesman. They get on
a train to London and they presumably try to sell. There’s almost like a double identity isn’t
there?
In this excerpt a scientist describes how the competition for funding resources
incentivises the competitors to represent their chosen hazard as the worst. This
insight illustrates how the background of disease control, even at the level of funda-
mental scientific research, is partly founded upon group interest. Practice regularly
appears overtly political, with parties acknowledging that they are packaging their
assessments in order to attract funding. At the same time much valuable quantitative
risk analysis is doubtlessly being conducted; data are being rigorously gathered;
comparisons between hazards are being made; risk analysis is being assiduously
undertaken. All the afore-mentioned have an important role in the design of policy.
This much is not in dispute. Our challenge is to the notion of a risk-based policy. This
study reveals that, according to the protagonists themselves, even the most funda-
mental drivers of research and of risk management activities in general are not
conceived in an apolitical vacuum, but are born out of group interests and enmeshed
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in competition for resources. When it comes to foundational development of policy,
those actively involved in conducting risk analysis and managing risk at all levels, are
clearly involved in political negotiation about how seriously their particular risk ought
to be taken. From a cultural theory perspective this is not a pejorative observation. The
worst is not an absolute scientific matter but always a partly normative judgement
assembled in a cultural, socioeconomic, political and uncertain world.
Acknowledging this brings us to the crux of the matter. The rationale of aspiring to
a risk-based policy, as an end that resists political vagaries and sets policy on an
objective footing, logically makes two erroneous assumptions: firstly that the worst is
an objective rather than a normative consideration suited to probabilistic approaches;
and secondly that it is possible to separate objective scientific endeavour from broader
political realities in complex socio-technical situations. Both these assumptions are
challenged in the disease-containment scenarios in which the actors interviewed in
this article are engaged.
Group interests led to variations in the competition theme. In the following excerpt
a scientist describes the requirement for a policy decision to operate in the face of
scientific indeterminacy:
So I don’t question that modellers are useful,... but what would happen if in 2007 the
modellers said, ‘We have to vaccinate’ and the veterinary advice was, ‘We don’t have to
vaccinate’?... Who’s going to make a decision on that?
Other comments revealed instances where risk analysts were held, by our expert
interviewees, to be ignorant of political exigencies. Contributors whose senior roles
had drawn them into the policymaking web alleged that laboratory-bound colleagues
had an ivory tower naivety. A veterinary scientist viewed mathematical modellers as
lacking hands-on disease experience. Other comments stopped short of attributing
blame to specific actors but rather drew attention to indeterminacies that could have
major influence.
The next example concerns a policy to cull rather than to vaccinate in response to
FMD:
I know in 2001, I think it was 18 months before Japan would buy beef from the UK again,
not the six months that was stipulated by OIE [World Organisation for Animal Health] at the
time. Once you lose your footing in the market, somebody else will get in there ... it wouldn’t
just be a question of, ‘Oh, you know, OIE says we’re okay, we can trade again,’ you’ve lost
those partners and those links because somebody else is selling it to them. Brazil’s selling it
to them cheaper or something.... So you’ve got those economic aspects that are very difficult
to pin down in monetary terms ...
The trade implications in the preceding excerpt are characterised in terms of fiscal
uncertainty. The contributor allows that policy needs to be adaptive to market effects
that often resist quantification.
The preceding extracts from a large data set have shown a tension between calls for
a foundational shift in approach and an appreciation of the rationale behind the
current, more holistic approach. The article next turns to a consideration of the reason
for this tension.
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Discussion
This article identifies a rhetorical commitment to risk-based policy among a group of
actors influential in the construction of animal disease-containment policy. Further-
more, it shows that participants express awareness consistent with Douglas’ claim
that the risk thinking that is central to policy debates is frequently divorced from
probability calculations (Douglas 1992a). But our objective is not simply to observe
that the social construction of risk is necessarily wider than quantitative risk analysis.
What our analysis shows is that as they socially construct risk, our contributors
entertain paradoxical positions; on the one hand aspirational, commitments to risk-
based policy, and on the other, explicit political awareness, acknowledging a more
constrained role for quantitative risk analysis. The commitment to risk-based policy
appears here to represent an alternative and ideal, fundamental starting point for
policy, and the contributors who propose the paradigm of risk-based policy are pre-
cisely the sort of actors who might be expected to make such commitments. They are
scientists, professional risk managers, mathematical risk modellers and other actors
required to work with abstract risk and to feed knowledge into policy. Yet, simulta-
neously and crucially, the same actors often appear quite at one with the political
dimensions of risk construction where risk-based considerations are clearly not foun-
dational. Quite diverse opportunities or contingencies are often much more central.
As Tschinkel argues:
A good manager of an environmental agency needs to seize opportunities based on numer-
ous factors other than risk. Political breakthroughs, statutory readiness, talent and inclina-
tion of leadership, availability of new technical information, and the degree of cooperation
from sister agencies are some of these factors. The degree to which risk-based planning
system discourages this kind of creative opportunism makes it less valuable. (Tschinkel
1994, p. 184)
The participants in our project variously recognised opportunities related to all of
these numerous factors. They talked about political opportunities resulting from
deregulation in the water sector, European regulatory frameworks, technological
innovation and networks of cooperation. Timing, benign circumstances and leader-
ship, all either contributed to or underpinned examples of disease control policy
development. For example:
... one area is very dependent on industry support ... their interest is in modification of the
immune response of animals at the level of the stem cell, and also in looking at transgenic
disease resistant animals. So, the model there is influenza resistant poultry and the reason
they’ve been able to get that project up and funded is because of the nature of the struc-
ture of the industry. Because it’s so integrated and there’s so few players at the very top
end, it’s the broiler industry I’m talking about, you know.... I mean, those guys do think,
sort of, five, ten, fifteen, twenty years ahead and they can get their act together to actually
help.
In the preceding excerpt the existence of a corporate market concentration is favour-
ably represented as an enabling progress.
Risk-based approaches clearly have a role to play in policy directed towards
complex social issues involving uncertainty, but the calls in our data to found policy
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on probabilistic approaches to risk seem to be curiously inconsistent with the
understandings of politics that the advocates of risk-based policy reveal through their
acknowledgement that policy is almost inevitably reactive, and that when outbreaks
of disease occur, particularly novel forms with a high degree of uncertainty over their
epidemiology such as when H5N1 emerged around 2007, resources will be switched.
At times the interviewees also appreciate the complexity of the constraints on policy
with, for example, where trade considerations have to be weighed against animal
welfare, or where issues of international justice arise as when the rich define controls
for the poor, and a whole range of ethical and moral matters quite beyond the scope
of conventional forms of risk analysis. Indeed, contributors conceded that risk-based
approaches often seem more intelligible when placed further downstream, at the
implementation rather than the strategy development phase. For example, the
control of FMD in the national herd will be the result of a host of political consid-
erations, coinciding in a coalition of forces in support of a control policy (see Latour
1988). An FMD-free status, like any policy, serves a variety of interests; including, as
in this case, the livestock export industry, whose livelihood is at stake. After the
strategic policy has been thrashed out in the normal heat and grime of politics with
its horse-trading, coalition-building, populist pandering, and of course, all the more
noble political elements: the altruism, idealism and fraternity by which people seek
to improve the common lot; then the practical planning of measures can enter the
phase where quantitative risk analysis is efficacious.
Detecting inconsistency in the logic of discourse is not remarkable, nor is it
unusual to find a group of professionals who are aware of an intractable political
universe in which effective policy has many potential drivers. Nevertheless, it is
interesting from a sociological perspective to critique the widely held view that the
narrow instrument of risk by which we mean a probabilistic, reductionist version of
risk management (what Beck 1992, p. 6) calls, ‘the calculus of risk [an innovation]
making the incalculable calculable’) should be promoted as a policy base. Against this
we develop Douglas ’s (1992a) claim that probabilistic risk is neither foundational in
practice nor desirable as a foundation when it comes to making policy about socio-
technical hazards.
From a cultural theory perspective, the emphasis on a narrow instrument of risk
can be seen as reinforcing a boundary between the status of insiders and outsiders.
It functions to allow a professional practice to be established in upstream decision-
making and given pre-eminence. The justification for this approach proffered by
participants stems from what they characterise as the fickleness of public opinion
and the opportunity to marginalise this undesirable element from approaches to
disease containment, thereby reducing dangers. But however apparently well-
intentioned it is, the call for the elevation of the narrow instrument of risk is not
neutral but acts as a cipher for more objectivity, more science, and more expert input
into practices of risk management. These tacit meanings transform the term ‘risk-
based’ into a metonym for science-led hazard management, a rhetoric all the more
persuasive in current western epistemology where science exerts a strong claim to
monopolise objectivity, and where any appeal to this provenance is difficult to
gainsay. Policy towards serious hazards indeed requires properly resourced, science-
led research and it is generally sensible to argue for more of it. The question as to
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whether such a policy ought to be risk-based, however, is subtly but profoundly
different and problematic. While aims to increase the scientific understanding of
disease and to reduce the uncertainties that hamper disease mitigation are superfi-
cially uncontroversial as general policy directions, there are controversies (as our data
show) over the detailed circumstances of disease outbreaks and what should be done
about disease. Risk is ubiquitous but matters of epidemiological concern that rise to
the top of the political agenda and demand action do not do so on the basis of
probabilistic risk but because of the totality of their characteristics, including histori-
cal antecedents, perceptions of official mismanagement (Murphy-Lawless 2004),
so-called dread (Slovic 1987) and, often, scientific uncertainty. These realities high-
light dangers in heeding rhetorical pleas for risk-based policy in the potential framing
of policy in ways that exclude other social understandings of disease containment,
including competing scientific understandings (Wynne 2002). Underlying struc-
tures of belief can shape policy positions, often tacitly (Schön and Rein 1994, p. 23 in
Nerlich 2004). In the case of animal disease containment, the advocacy of a risk
based approach as an ideal foundation for policy correspondingly acts to demote the
more democratic societal interests evident in political processes. The risk base para-
digm implies that policy ought not to begin with democratic concerns but with a
quantitative understanding of risk so as to minimise the impact of irrational misdi-
rection through everyday politics. Cultural theory is alert to strategies that deploy a
moral condemnation of the outside world by group insiders, pointing out that such
strategies often serve to promote the lobbying group’s interests (Douglas 1992a). As
the evidence presented here shows, some of those advocating risk-based policy (our
interviewees) at times openly acknowledge they are pursuing their personal and
professional interests as they advocate that particular risks should be given greater
resources or a higher priority than others. At other times motives may be concealed
(for example, see Latour and Woolgar 1986). Scientists may lay claim to a special
scientific methodology when defending their version of objective reality, yet any
selection of purported facts and their deployment owes much to the interests of the
groups selecting them, through what Latour and Woolgar refer to as the solidarity of
their production, achieved through a system of accreditation in which all the actors
are heavily invested. The extent of that investment leads experts to claim that the
beliefs and economics that underpin their constructs are circumstantial and unre-
lated to the solidity of their claims. Hence, acknowledgements of vested interests
vanish from accounts (Latour and Woolgar 1986). In other words, the explicit rec-
ognition of interests tends to be absent in official reports detailing the risk-
construction process. The data presented here capture the reality of our contributors
double-identity as, on the one hand, they make claims to an objective reality freed
from the pollution of politics and yet on the other, when asked to reflect on the wider
picture, they readily acknowledge they actively participate in the political universe in
their processes of fact production. What may be missing from their official accounts,
for example, their journal articles and reports or policy recommendations, was
revealed discursively as the participants shared their concerns about funding. The
specialists among them had selected to study the diseases that defined their careers
without regard to risk probabilities but quite explicitly on the basis of what interested
them the most. In pursuance of careers they packaged and represented their special
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interest in the manner of salespeople (the word used by one participant) in order to
obtain grants and funding. At the same time they called for more risk-based policy,
not as a challenge to the political system in which many of them seemed entrenched,
but as a symbolic gesture, making a claim for a transference of power and marking
out territory.
Given that group self-interest is often pursued through cultural symbols, an idea
central to cultural theory, it follows that calls for risk-based policy can be partly
explained as a rhetorical request for more prestige and resources to be directed to the
particular social group likely to benefit most. The various experts can be seen as
capitalising on what they regard as negative elements of democratic society whereby
it takes a crisis to get anything done or where public perception appears to range
between risk attenuation and risk amplification (Kasperson et al. 1988). In other
words, the function of the risk-based policy rhetoric is to encourage a degree of
rebalancing in favour of techno-scientific management:
Danger is defined to protect the public good and the incidence of blame is a by-product of
arrangements for persuading fellow members to contribute to it. (Douglas 1992: 6)
In short, expert groups have varied motivations, including strong interests to
control certain resources. Rather than wanting a foundational shift for policy, their
choice of expression is often simply rhetorical – a political overture to package their
claims for additional resources. In such cases cultural theory appears to offer a
useful explanatory lens revealing that group projects that are furthered through
symbolic forms.
However, the phenomenon of calls for more risk-based policy cuts across narrow
group affiliations. The calls for governance, as currently practiced, to be placed on a
significantly different footing clearly have broader support than merely risk profes-
sional insiders defending their corner. Latour (1988) explains that social transforma-
tions, in this case a proposed shift to a more technocratic approach to risk control,
require broad-based support through the enrolment of groups with separate agendas.
It has been proposed that a fundamental problem has emerged in society in relation
to its policymaking, which Hajer (2003) has called the institutional void. Old certain-
ties through which public officials were trusted to balance different policy require-
ments equitably have collapsed. The reason for this new landscape is that boundaries
of sovereign polities have crisscrossed competing orders of authority existing as
transnational and polycentric networks. Old levels of deference have declined. Where
policy problems that demand political action occupy territory near to or across com-
peting boundaries, authority is difficult to establish. Enticott and Frankin (2009) have
identified precisely such problems in the containment of bovine tuberculosis and the
associated uncertainties requiring political action in this space. Hajer’s thesis might
explain the generality of calls for risk-based policy that were encountered in the data.
The absence of definitive authoritative underpinnings that has resulted in multiple
levels of challenge to policy across society may act to promote risk analysis as a
potential solution for dealing with the institutional void. But the prospect is anathema
to Beck (1992), who sees the delegitimised technocratic regime of scientific-
administrative expertise (see also Speck 2013) collapsing under reflexive modernity.
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Douglas (1992a) is equally critical, viewing such calls as no more than arm waving
towards fictitious escape routes.
Conclusion
The notion that policy ought to be founded upon probabilistic risk is, for cultural
theory, misconceived. Risk itself is constructed. It serves to represent the relationships
of people and things rather than being, in the conventional sense, a thing (Rayner
1988). Therefore, when policy is forged, as evidenced in the current context, it
emerges intersubjectively. While probabilistic risk can certainly inform policy and
may often need greater emphasis, it is, from a cultural theory perspective, neither
what policy is based on nor what it ought to be based on. A quantitative assessment
to determine ‘which worst gets most’ or ‘goes first’ in the complex context of animal
health, and indeed all socio-technical hazards, for cultural theory, is not feasible. In
democratic societies it is politics, with all its messiness, that is the only viable
mechanism for the development of animal disease-containment policy, and calls for
an alternative, purer risk-based approach, viewed through the cultural theory lens, are
misconceived, exceeding what quantitative risk assessment is capable of. With the
enormous complexity of different interests, from animal welfare to world poverty, the
capacity of risk instruments to objectively determine priorities is and must remain
severely limited. Quantitative risk analysis, its pretensions towards purity through a
calculus of risk notwithstanding, is hugely important but it is subordinate to the
social, intersubjective, inescapably political environment. The overwhelming pres-
ence of concrete reality necessarily precedes the abstraction of probabilistic risk in
strict sequence and constitutes risk’s foundation. Risk is always subordinate to and
predicated upon the reality it seeks to explain. Of course, the relative cultural value of
quantitative risk assessment as opposed to the political process is often rhetorically
inverted with technical assessment frequently proposed as a more ideal starting-point.
Reductionist belief in this ascendancy underpins calls for risk-based policy. The
unpredictability, complexity, and for some, dangerous relativism of the political risk
perspective understandably leads to a desire for the apparent surety of quantitative
risk analysis to shore up otherwise fragile policy foundations; a prospect supported by
actors staring into an institutional void. However, political realities will not bow to
naive desires for a quieter, purer life. The peaceful centres of progress and rationality
(Beck 1992) are mirages. Good policy needs to reconcile the best use of technical
abstractions without reifying them and to come to terms with the reality of a com-
petitive, multi-actor world that is continually frustrating and inherently uncertain.
The experts we studied in the context of animal disease management recognise these
challenges and openly acknowledge the necessity of exploiting the opportunities and
avoiding the pitfalls of contingent reality. Calls for an alternative, risk-based approach,
are better critically viewed as rhetorical pleas for more quantitative risk analysis,
rather than a feasible proposal for a foundational shift.
Note
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